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 3 
INTRODUCTION* 
 
In everyday life we are constantly confronted with situations that 
we think require us to trust. Getting on the bus, depositing a check, 
or simply buying food from a local street vendor all seem to call 
upon us to trust to some degree. The suggestion that we regularly 
trust in these instances is fairly noncontroversial among writers on 
trust. Some philosophers such as Onora O’Neill have suggested 
that in such routine circumstances we may often find we have no 
choice but to trust.1 Others, such as Philip Pettit, have suggested 
we “may have no option but to make [trust] manifest.”2 But is it 
right to characterise this as trust? The central purpose of this paper 
will be to answer this question of whether the nature of trust allows 
for trusting because we have no other option.  
This question has not received significant theoretical 
consideration from philosophers who have decided to focus their 
interest on other issues of trust. These include determining the role 
trust plays in broader social and interpersonal contexts,3 the extent 
to which there is a prudential value of trust,4 or even if people can 
be innately considered as “high” or “low” trusters. 5  These 
multidimensional discussions of trust all help inform the question 
to be answered in this paper, but none specifically help address 
whether we can trust because we have no choice, and thus, whether 
trust necessarily requires a free choice. 
 In this paper I will argue that when we are in a situation where 
we can choose to trust, trusting necessarily requires a free choice; a 
requirement of non-coercion, such that any action resembling trust 
under the constraint of coercion ought to be understood as 
something else, such as reliance or hope.6 Moreover, I will argue 
                                                
* Many thanks to Sarah Gibbons, Charles Arcus, Calvin Chan, Eleanor Gurney, Chris 
Coffman and Xanthe Coffman for useful comments on this paper. I especially thank Tom 
Dougherty for his availability for consultation, advice and unwavering patience throughout 
the entire writing process.  
1 O’Neill does not suggest this as an explicit claim in regard to personal relations, but rather 
in regard to broader social relations. Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12.  
2 Philip Pettit, “The Cunning of Trust,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 24 3 (1995): 208.  
3 A number of writers discuss this, including: Toshio Yamagishi, “Trust as a Form of Social 
Intelligence,” in Trust in Society, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000); Niklas 
Luhmann, Trust and Power, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 49.  
4 See Guido Mollering, Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity, (Oxford: Elsevier, 2006), 110.  
5 Parth Dasgupta, “Trust as a Commodity,” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 54. Russell Hardin argues against the validity of these 
perspectives in Trust & Trustworthiness, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 35. 
6 Later in the paper I will offer some alternatives to trusting in these coercion circumstances.  
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we cannot trust because we have no choice—in these cases we 
simply rely. In order to realise these claims, there are a number of 
conceptual hurdles to overcome. In the first section of the paper I 
will characterise reliance. People often couple the concepts of trust 
and reliance, but when attempting to characterise the uncoercive 
feature of trust, we discover some fundamental differences. In the 
second section, I will establish my position on the nature of trust in 
order to show trust is something we can choose to do. Moreover, 
understanding the nature of trust will help to understand that its 
features require an uncoercive quality, such that coercion leads 
trust to be categorically downgraded to mere reliance.  
In the third section I will show the claim that trust requires a 
quality of necessary freedom of choice faces an important 
objection: namely that trust should not be thought of as an action, 
and as such we cannot find ourselves in a position to adopt it. 
Russell Hardin, arguably the preeminent philosopher on trust, 
champions this claim with a strict-belief account of trust, and 
disputes the thought that we can elect to trust others, arguing that 
trust is simply a belief, where one can only trust if one believes the 
other to be completely trustworthy.7 If, with Hardin, we do not take 
trust to be an action, then the issue of whether we can choose to 
trust fails to arise; the consideration of choice only follows from 
establishing trust to have the quality of being an action.  
I will endeavour to overcome Hardin’s objection by showing 
there are indeed many instances where we can come to choose to 
confer trust on people we believe to be deserving, advocating what 
I will coin, the ‘action-based’ account of trust.8 Following Richard 
Holton, I will suggest trust can only be considered an action in 
certain kinds of situations; situations specifically compatible with 
the Strawsonian ‘participant stance’.9 Holton’s claim that trust can 
manifest as both the basis of belief or as action we choose—termed 
                                                
7 He states, “Entrusting, accepting a promise, agreeing to a contract, are actions . . . Trust is 
not an action” Hardin, Trust & Trustworthiness, p. 37. 
8 A number of philosophers endorse this claim suggesting both implicitly and explicitly, that 
trust is an action we often find ourselves choosing. Such notable philosophers include, 
Kenneth Arrow, The Limits of Organization, (New York: Norton, 1974), John Dunn, “Trust 
and Political Agency,” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. D. 
Gambetta (New York: Knopf, 1988), Luhmann, Trust and Power.  
9 The participant stance, Holton argues, is a kind of disposition we hold towards others 
entailing a response of particular reactive attitudes. These attitudes arise when people act in 
certain ways towards us. Holton believes trust involves a participant stance towards the 
person you are trusting; namely, one must have a readiness to feel betrayed should trust be 
disappointed, and gratitude should it be fulfilled. Richard Holton, “Deciding to Trust, 
Coming to Believe,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994): 63-76.   
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in this paper as ‘strict-belief’ and ‘action-based’ accounts—is   
plausible when we consider the trusting of close family members 
and friends, and on the other hand, the trusting of complete 
strangers.10  
The account of trust I am focused on in this paper, then, is the 
action-based account. This conception of trust, following Holton, 
sees trust as an extension of reliance that utilizes the participant 
attitudes of Strawson. 11   Trust reliably materializes when we 
believe someone is trustworthy, but we need not be entirely 
assured of his or her trustworthiness to still choose to trust. I 
contend that when we choose to trust, we necessarily require a free 
choice because only we can decide for ourselves, as free and 
autonomous actors, how we stand in relation to others. Only we 
can choose to take the participant stance towards someone, and as 
such, only we can choose to trust. What is distinctive about trust, 
then, is not that it can be chosen; it is that when it is chosen, it is 
chosen freely. By illustrating the requirement of free choice, I will 
show that it is incoherent to say, “you have no choice but to 
trust.”12 
 
I. RELIANCE 
 
The suggestion that we might trust in situations because we have 
no choice is a widely shared intuition. Onora O’Neill echoes this 
intuition in, A Question of Trust, where she discusses the capacity 
of citizens to trust the state.13 She writes,  
 
“We constantly place trust in others, in members of 
professions and in institutions . . . even if we have some 
misgivings, we go on placing trust in medicines produced 
                                                
10 Other philosophers considering the nature of trust have endorsed elements mirroring 
Holton’s conception, describing trust as “an action we take”, or a “necessary choice”. See 
John Dunn, “The Concept of ‘Trust’ in the Politics of John Locke.” In Philosophy of 
History, ed. J. Schneewind, R. Rorty and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984); Annette Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” Ethics 96 2 (1986): 231—60; Gary 
Miller, “Why is Trust Necessary in Organizations? The Moral Hazard of Profit 
Maximization,” in Trust in Society, ed. K. S. Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2001). 
11  Holton’s account of trust utilizes P.F. Strawson’s account of reactive attitudes in 
“Freedom and Resentment,” in his Freedom and Resentment and other Essays (London: 
Methuen Publishers, 1974): 1-25.   
12 This statement is an intuitive claim you might hear and uncritically endorse in a primitive 
action movie or cartoon.  
13 O’Neill, A Question of Trust, p. 11.  
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by the pharmaceutical industry, in operations performed in 
NHS hospitals, in the delivery of letters by the Post Office, 
and in roads shared with many notably imperfect 
drivers.”14  
 
It seems to be a common thought that the reality of citizens’ 
attending to their daily activities provokes a powerful sense of 
governments and large institutions as having full control of the 
material realities of our existence that mark us as dependent 
beings; so much so that people believe themselves to be in a 
position where they have no choice but to trust. But the proposition 
that we have no choice but to trust raises the question: do we really 
trust in situations such as this? Are we really trusting despite 
questioning the trustworthiness of our target? 
I will argue for the claim that what we are doing is relying on 
these institutions. So, to suitably answer this question of trusting, 
we must first characterise reliance. The reason why I focus on 
reliance first in an account of trust is because I think it makes more 
sense to be able to coerce someone into reliance than it is to coerce 
someone into trust. People are misled that you can also be coerced 
into trusting because reliance and trust are commonly understood 
to be similar concepts that share an important range of common 
characteristics. 15  This explains why people often get them 
confused.  
Relying is undoubtedly an action we do regularly. We can rely 
on almost anything; people, objects, even the occurrence of events. 
For example, we might rely on it being sunny tomorrow, or our 
pen not to run out of ink during an exam. We are often reliant on 
more welfare-imperative issues too, like our household smoke 
alarms to alert us during a fire. We might also rely on the mail to 
be delivered on time for a friend’s birthday, or on a civil war to not 
break out in the country we visit for a holiday. There is any 
number of examples of day-to-day reliance, and I will suggest we 
should think of reliance as being closely tethered to the idea of 
dependence. We rely or depend in these situations because we need 
assistance.  
                                                
14 Ibid. p. 12. 
15 At first glance, trusting and reliance are very similar: both involve dependence on others 
for some kind of goal, being vulnerable and taking some kind of risk. See Russell Hardin, 
Trust, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 47. 
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So, when we choose to rely on someone or something, we do 
so because we recognise the need for assistance in achieving some 
kind of goal, and we believe some person or thing is capable of 
helping us achieve that goal. In a similar vein, Richard Holton 
argues that when someone relies on something to happen, “one 
works the supposition that it will happen into one’s plans.”16 In this 
way, reliance is an other-directed action; it is an action we take 
toward someone or something else when we need to depend or 
count on them (or it). You might believe someone or something is 
capable of helping you because there is evidence for it: you may 
know that your phone has the capability for GPS because you saw 
someone else with the same phone use it for GPS; you may believe 
your dog has elevated senses of hearing and smell, so you rely on it 
to keep your house protected from burglars while you sleep. There 
are, it seems, plenty of good reasons why you might want to rely 
on others.17  
Although there are many good reasons for opting to rely, 
relying on someone because it is your only option (or because you 
are coerced) is not a good reason for reliance. I have claimed we 
rely on persons or things because we acknowledge the need for 
assistance and we believe that who or what we are relying on will 
come through for us. But there are counterexamples to the second 
condition. We might acknowledge the need for assistance in some 
situation, but only have one person to rely on, such that we have no 
other option. In such a case, we do not need to believe they will 
come through for us. For example, Andy might want to achieve his 
goal of having an outdoor picnic with his family, but to achieve his 
goal he must rely on the weather to be good. In this case, Andy has 
no other option but to rely on the weather to achieve his goal 
(assuming Andy will not compromise on the location and will not 
have the picnic in poor weather). It might be that tomorrow is the 
                                                
16 Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe”, p. 72.  
17 When you choose to rely on someone or something, based on good reasons—such that 
you deem them likely to be reliable—you necessarily take on some kind of risk; you risk the 
person you are relying on may turn out to be unreliable. Whatever you want achieved is 
rendered unachievable if the person you relied on fails you. So, you might rely on your 
alarm clock to wake you in the morning, but should it fail you, you will be late to work. By 
relying on the alarm clock you are depending on it; though you recognize it may let you 
down. Should you believe your alarm clock to be faulty, you might configure your phone to 
wake you up as well. You can mitigate the risk of not having what you want achieved by 
coming up with an alternative arrangement. Should you be disappointed, you often appeal to 
wanting these other possibilities: “I wish I got the car serviced when I was supposed to!”, or 
“I never should have depended on City Rail to get me to my interview!” are common 
responses to unfulfilled reliance.   
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only day he can have a family picnic, so he is relying on the 
weather to be good even though it is forecast for rain. Andy has no 
other choice but to rely, even though he fails to believe the weather 
will be good. He can only hope for good weather.  
In a similar vein, it could be that we are coerced by someone 
into reliance. In such a scenario we might need some kind of 
assistance, and be forced into relying on someone who we do not 
judge to be reliable. In the case of coercion, we may not judge 
them to be reliable, and therefore not choose to rely on them; but 
we are coerced and therefore have no other choice but to rely. For 
example, we might be the victim of a kidnapping and have no other 
choice but to rely on our captor to keep us safe.   
This result suggests there is greater value in having the choice 
to rely—when we are not coerced and can make a choice on who 
or what to rely on, we have the opportunity to give ourselves the 
best chance of success and minimise the risk involved.  We should 
think of the two different kinds of reliance as follows:  
 
Optional reliance: We rely on someone or something in 
this sense when we freely choose to rely on them. 
 
 Non-optional reliance: We rely on someone or something 
in this sense when we have no choice but to rely on them.18  
 
The tension illustrated here with non-optional reliance is 
overcome, however, by the nature of reliance. Reliance, as opposed 
to trust, has the feature of allowing it to continue to operate even 
when it is a result of coercion or because there is no other option.19 
Why might this be the case? It seems a dire situation where one’s 
life is at stake is a case when one is coerced; there is not much else 
that can be done except for continued reliance and hope that the 
outcome you want achieved still eventuates. In coercive cases such 
as this, there is simply no other choice. Regardless of the situation, 
reliance stays essentially unchanged, despite any inclusion of 
coercive factors.  
So, we might conclude that if we have to rely on someone, and 
we are free from any coercive constraints, we are making a free 
choice to rely. But if we must rely because there is no other 
                                                
18 I thank Calvin Chan for suggesting this separation.  
19 I contend in the next section that trust fails to have this quality.  
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alternative (perhaps because someone has made it our only option), 
we can be sure that we are not making a free choice. Thus, I will 
make the following substantive claim about the nature of reliance: 
 
If we are relying on someone or something because it is 
our only option, we do not make a free choice to rely.  
 
This may appear to be an obvious, trivial claim to make; however, 
I believe it is fundamental and as such should be treated as a 
requirement for understanding the nature of trusting. I have 
illustrated that there are many situations where we can rely on 
someone without them having our full confidence. Reliance on 
someone may not be the choice we would have wanted or selected 
for ourselves, but is, in any kind of situation where there is no 
choice, the only thing we can do. So, returning to O’Neill’s case of 
‘trusting’ the government, what I think we really say when there is 
a suggestion that we have no choice but to trust the government is 
that we have no choice but to rely on the government. I have 
attempted to characterise reliance and establish the premise that if 
we are relying on someone when it is our only option, then we do 
not make a free choice to do so.  In the next section I will 
characterise the nature of trust, exploring in what ways trust 
fundamentally differs from reliance. 
 
II. THE NATURE OF TRUST  
 
In the previous section I characterised reliance, and argued for the 
claim that we do not make a free choice when we rely on someone 
in a situation where it is our only option. This discussion served to 
illustrate two important points relating to the nature of trust: first, 
when your options are externally limited for reliance, you do not 
make a free choice to rely; second, you continue to rely on 
someone or something even when you do not make a free choice. 
These two aspects of reliance are imperative in answering the 
question of whether trust has a necessary uncoercive component 
because reliance is conceptually similar to trust. But what are the 
differences between reliance and trust, and how do they relate to 
trusting when there is no option?  
Similarly to when we rely on others, when we trust, we depend 
on another. But we ought to understand the dependence of trusting 
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to be slightly different to the dependence of reliance: when we 
trust, we do so with other people, and it is with people we can have 
trusting relationships with.20 Unlike reliance, where we can rely on 
any number of objects to help us achieve a goal, with trust, we 
depend only on a person or a collective of persons to help us 
achieve a goal. Following Richard Holton, I will argue trust is a 
special kind of reliance between people.21  
Holton, along with other writers on trust, acknowledges the 
importance of differentiating trust from reliance and characterises 
trust as an extension of reliance, calling it a “kind of reliance.”22 
He offers a persuasive characterisation of trust: trust is a type of 
reliance grounded in the Strawsonian “participant stance”.23 P. F. 
Strawson defines the origin of these participant stance attitudes as 
coming from the nature of certain kinds of relationships:  
 
“We should think of the many different kinds of 
relationship which we can have with other people—as 
sharers of a common interest; as members of the same 
family; as colleagues; as friends; as lovers; as chance 
parties to an enormous range of transactions and 
encounters. Then we should think, in each of these 
connections in turn, and in others, of the kind of 
importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions 
towards us of those who stand in these relationships to us, 
and of the kinds of reactive attitudes and feelings to which 
we ourselves are prone. In general, we demand some 
degree of goodwill or regard on the part of those who stand 
in these relationships to us, though the forms we require it 
to take vary widely in different connections. The range and 
intensity of our reactive attitudes towards goodwill, its 
absence or its opposite vary no less widely. I have 
mentioned, specifically, resentment and gratitude; and they 
are a usefully opposed pair. But, of course, there is a whole 
continuum of reactive attitude and feeling stretching on 
                                                
20 I will leave it open for debate that we can trust animals, though I will posit no such 
position here.  
21 Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” p. 65.   
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. p. 68. 
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both sides of these and—the most comfortable area—in 
between them.”24  
 
Strawson’s outline of the different types of attitudes we have 
towards others we are in relationships with is important when 
explaining the nature of trust, as trust is a certain kind of 
relationship we have with others. Strawson’s purpose is to 
highlight how we have different emotional attitudes towards 
people, such as resentment, forgiveness and gratitude, found in the 
participant attitude, compared to the emotional attitudes we have 
towards objects, found in the ‘objective attitude’.25  
For Holton, then, relations of trust should be considered the 
same as relations of reliance, but with an added assumption of 
responsibility present.26 When we trust, we rely on others from 
within the “participant attitude,” as a way of being in “ordinary 
inter-personal relationships,” showing a readiness to hold ourselves 
and others responsible for actions taken.27 Strawson contrasted this 
participant stance with another way of approaching others, called 
the “objective attitude.” 28  From within the objective attitude, 
people approach others as a somewhat predictable entity “to be 
managed or handled or cured or trained; and perhaps simply to be 
avoided.”29 In the fully objective attitude we regard the attitudes, 
wills and motives of others as units to predict in order to support 
our own ends for them. In doing so, we do not treat our affiliation 
with them either in a capacity focused on their own ends or to us as 
one of responsibility. Strawson claimed, “To adopt the objective 
attitude to another human being is to see him . . . as an object of 
social policy.”30 He goes on to say, “we can have direct dealings 
with human beings without any degree of personal involvement, 
treating them simply as creatures to be handled in our own interest 
                                                
24 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” p. 8.  
25 This is not his only purpose, however. Strawson also writes, “It is one thing to ask about 
the general causes of these reactive attitudes I have alluded to; it is another to ask about the 
variations to which they are subject, the particular conditions in which they do or do not 
seem natural or reasonable or appropriate; and it is a third thing to ask what it would be like, 
what it is like, not to suffer them. I am not much concerned with the first question; but I am 
with the second; and perhaps even more with the third.” Strawson, “Freedom and 
Resentment,” p. 4.  
26 Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” p. 70.  
27 Ibid. p. 67. 
28 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” p. 7. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. p. 5. 
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. . .”31 In this way, taking the objective stance towards others 
forgoes any kind of relationship-centric reactive attitudes 
(including resentment, gratitude or forgiveness), and instead 
involves more standard reactive attitudes such as anger or 
frustration.   
In this fully objective attitude we do not require ourselves to be 
accountable to others in terms of responsibility, or vice versa. To 
the extent that we do this, we cease to see them as reciprocal 
participants with us in the practice of “holding each other 
responsible.”32 It may be the case we see ourselves as responsible 
“for” them, protecting what we think are their interests, and 
perhaps accounting to others for the job we do. Strawson suggested 
we might view them entirely as entities we need to control for our 
safety, amusement, or convenience; we may use, trick, or simply 
manage them. But insofar as we do this, Strawson argued, we 
refuse to meet them in the plane of mutual responsiveness to 
normative expectations and reciprocal accountability for our 
responses.  
Holton’s view, then, appropriates Strawson’s conception of the 
objective and participant attitudes: for Holton, trusting someone is 
relying on him or her to do something, and being ready to react to 
their performance or non-performance with reactive attitudes such 
as resentment and gratitude. In being ready to react to people, we 
take up a stance of the participant attitude, the readiness to respond 
to people, and only to people, with this distinctive range of 
reactions.33 As Holton puts it: “when a machine breaks down we 
might feel angry or annoyed; but not (unless we are inveterately 
anthropomorphic) resentful.”34  
Our attitudes toward household smoke detectors, or the mail 
service, do not extend beyond desiring the achievement of basic 
outcomes, and if they are unfulfilled, we might be angry but not 
resentful. Objects and events do not encapsulate our interest or care 
for our motivations (as they very well may do in trusting); we 
simply require they perform their function reliably. If they prove to 
be unreliable in the moments when we need them most we are 
                                                
31 Ibid. p. 7.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” p. 71. 
34 Holton identifies this general condition distinguishing trust from reliance, but crucially, 
Holton does not focus on the difference in responsibility that Strawson identifies. For 
Strawson, the participant attitude is a stance that we take toward others in holding them 
responsible. 
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often angry or frustrated—but our reaction is not a resentful one; 
we are angry with the object, or the manufacturer who made it, or 
the salesman who sold it to us. We might even be angry with 
ourselves for relying on it too heavily against our better judgment. 
But this response to unfulfilled reliance on either a person or object 
has a fundamental difference to trusting, which I will address in the 
next section.35 Thus, we should accept that when we rely on others 
and things, we take a kind of Strawsonian objective stance towards 
them.  
The difference between the participant stance and the objective 
stance can be more explicitly illustrated with a simple day-to-day 
example: when I rely on the local café manager to provide me with 
my morning coffee every day because he or she usually does so, 
even when no one has promised or guaranteed it, I am disappointed 
or frustrated when they are unexpectedly closed or out of the 
special kind of coffee I like. I do not, in this situation, feel betrayed 
or resentful towards the café manager. I expect the café to have my 
preferred kind of coffee in the mornings, but I do not trust the 
manager to make this the case. My expectation, while based on 
reasonable estimations of regularities upon which I am frequently 
dependent (or reliant), does not dispose me to react 
contemptuously to its disappointment. I am only moved to a 
response of such a kind, one of reactive attitudes (such as 
punishment or resentment) when I trust you to do what you ought 
to do and you fail to fulfill my trust.  
In the case of fulfilled trust, you might feel something along 
the lines of praise or gratitude towards the trusted. In this way, my 
expectation is a normative expectation. Normative expectations are 
not simply confident assumptions that people are likely to behave 
in particular ways; these expectations instead express a stance 
toward others that demands certain actions or behaviours of them, 
because it is what they are supposed to do (often, it is what they 
said they would do). Normative expectations of people embody a 
certain attitude toward them that is at the same time both generous 
and demanding: we treat others as responsible and potentially 
responsive, but at the same time we are prepared to react 
negatively if they do not do what they ought to do. 
                                                
35 On my account you cannot trust inanimate objects, so I will continue my discussion of 
reliance focusing on personal reliance.  
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We should come to think of trust, then, as a result of this 
movement from reliance to responsibility. In coming to trust others, 
one develops normative expectations of them, expectations that 
they will do what they should and as such we are authorised to 
hold them to it, in the form of reprimanding and demanding 
feelings, as well as lost potential for future trusting. Admittedly, it 
might be stretching our conception of trust to say that we are 
betrayed in all instances of trusting; it seems that in lesser instances, 
we may not feel as an intense a sensation such as full-blown 
betrayal. It could be we trust our housemate to look after our set of 
house keys on a night out. Although we might not feel betrayed if 
he or she loses them, I contend there is a difference between the 
disappointment found in unfulfilled reliance and in unfulfilled trust.  
Fundamentally, trust goes further than reliance in a substantive 
way: trust involves the building and maintenance of personal 
relationships.36 Margaret Walker echoes this position stating, “The 
thought in distinguishing trust from mere reliance is that trust 
among people captures a specially interpersonal attitude or relation, 
a kind of anticipation that is distinctive to how a person looks at, 
and can look at, other people.”37 
I suggest, then, we think of interpersonal trust generally as a 
kind of reliance on others whom we expect or believe to behave as 
if they are relied upon, and to behave in such a way that they are 
aware and liable to be held responsible for failing to do so or to 
make reasonable efforts to do so. If we return to our original 
understanding of reliance, we choose to rely on others because we 
need assistance with some goal and we believe something or 
someone will help us achieve the goal. Trust, then, is the same, 
except we engage with more personal, reactive attitudes toward 
them, such that we hold them normatively culpable if our trust is 
unfulfilled. Trust, then, is a derivative of reliance.  
 
The Action-based and Strict-belief Accounts of Trust  
 
At this point I will separate two conceptions of trust that we ought 
                                                
36 Many have philosophers agreed on the importance of the relationship potential of trust. 
See Simon Blackburn, “Trust, Cooperation, and Human Psychology,” in Trust & 
Governance, ed. V. Braithwaite and M. Levi (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998): 
28-46; Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin & Margaret Levi, Cooperation Without Trust?, (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).  
37 Margaret Walker, Moral Repair, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 74. 
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to consider. I will term the two accounts as the ‘action-based’ 
account and the ‘strict-belief’ account of trust. First, the action-
based account, supported by Holton, can be illustrated by an 
example of trust he offers, where one weighs up evidence and 
decides to trust. The example is of a trust circle in a drama class: in 
this standard team-building exercise, one person stands in the 
middle of a circle of their peers, is spun around, blindfolded until 
they lose their bearings, then falls like a log backwards to be 
caught by the group. Holton makes the claim that “there is a 
moment at which you weigh up whether or not to let yourself fall . 
. . It feels as though you are deciding whether or not to trust.”38 
Holton then goes on to ask, 
 
“Does my decision to trust the others entail that I believe 
they will catch me? If it does, does this in turn mean that 
when I decide to trust them, I also decide to believe that 
they will catch me? I think not. In order to trust I do not 
need to believe...Mightn’t I be most uncertain that I will be 
caught, but decide to trust anyway?”39 
 
For Holton, the decision to rely from the position of the participant 
stance can be sufficient for trusting. One need not have a full belief 
that the other is trustworthy. Thus, when we are in a situation 
where we want to trust someone but the evidence of their 
trustworthiness is lacking or unclear, we can choose to rely on 
them from the participant stance, and this counts as trusting. Take 
the following example: you are swimming at the beach by yourself 
and get caught in a dangerous rip, floating quickly out to sea. 
Exhausted from fighting the current, you are unsure whether you 
will make it back to shore until, out of nowhere, a lone surfer 
appears using a large paddle board and, observing that you might 
need help, offers you assistance. In this instance, you have no real 
evidence to suggest the paddle boarder is trustworthy, besides the 
skill with which she uses the paddleboard and her offer of 
assistance. It might be uncomfortable for you to put your welfare 
in the hands of a stranger, and you might hesitate to accept the 
offer. But in this instance, it seems plausible that you can choose to 
trust the paddle boarder. You might not have a strong belief for the 
                                                
38 Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” p. 63.  
39 Ibid.  
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trustworthiness and ability of the paddle boarder, but nevertheless, 
you decide to trust them after weighing up the evidence. In this 
sense, choosing to trust is an action you take when you are not 
entirely convinced of the trustworthiness of the actor. Such 
situations, however, do not explain all accounts of trusting, such as 
when we trust our family members or close friends. The ‘strict-
belief’ account of trust helps us to understand this kind of trusting. 
The best way to understand the strict-belief account is by 
thinking of a situation when you ask yourself whether something is 
true or not. In the case of the drama group, you might ask yourself, 
‘do I trust the people in the group?’ In this sense, you are trying to 
come to terms with whether or not you believe they will catch you, 
and whether or not you believe they will catch you indicates 
whether you trust them or not. According to the strict-belief 
account, you cannot decide to believe you trust someone just 
because you want to, or as Pamela Hieronymi argues, just because 
you think it might be good for the team dynamic.40 Either way, you 
might make a judgment about your confidence in the group, and 
find out that you do believe they will catch you. This 
understanding of trust I will call the ‘strict-belief’ account, because 
you trust only if you believe, and I will term the beliefs that arise, 
‘trusting beliefs’.41   
The strict-belief account and action-based account are thus 
opposing accounts of trust. Holton suggests that the reason you 
might choose to trust is based on a desire to build relationships 
with the people in your drama group. You might feel obliged in 
some way to act in a trusting manner, or in the face of your doubt 
might have some reason that makes falling seem worth the risk of 
injury and embarrassment. Even if we accept Hieronymi’s 
objection that reasons for trusting related to the value of trust are 
not good reasons, we can still accept that we often decide or 
choose to trust. Trust, then, is something we often choose to do, 
based on any number of reasons.  
The contrast of the action-based account and the strict-belief 
account can be seen in a couple of examples: on your way to work, 
a homeless man asks you for money outside of the local train 
station. He explains to you he needs money for food. You have no 
                                                
40 Pamela Hieronymi, “The Reasons of Trust,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 2 
(2008): 218.   
41 I have borrowed this term from Hieronymi.  
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evidence suggesting whether what he is saying is truthful or not, so 
you can choose to trust him and give over the money. You might 
not entirely believe what he says, but you might decide to trust the 
fact he does, at some level, need money to purchase food (even if 
his daily meal does not appear to be dependent entirely on your 
donation). Consider another example: your friend might offer to 
look after your dog while you are away for the weekend, and you 
might choose to trust them, despite knowing full well they may not 
have the strongest track record for looking after pets (they 
routinely forget to feed their hamster). We choose to trust them 
because they are our friend and we believe them to have our 
interests at heart. We believe them, based on previous evidence, to 
have goodwill towards us and therefore with achieving the goal, 
even if they have not proven to be particularly reliable or capable 
with animals. In this way, we do not necessarily believe they are 
entirely trustworthy, but trust them for other reasons.42 We could 
say, “I know pets aren’t your thing, but I’m trusting you to look 
after Sheila.” In the Strawsonian sense, in trusting them we are 
choosing to hold them responsible for what they say they will do, 
and are prepared to feel resentment if they let us down, or be 
praiseworthy if they come through for us.   
I have established, then, the move from mere reliance to trust, 
and the difference between the strict-belief account and the action-
based account. This discussion serves to show the nature of trust 
and how we can come to choose to trust. This is important for 
illustrating the uncoercive nature of trust, for as I will argue, 
having a free choice to trust is central to the broader project of 
trusting. In the next section I will offer an objection to the idea that 
we can choose to trust and suggest a way forward.  
 
 III.  A DEFENSE OF THE ACT OF TRUSTING 
 
Until this point I have been concerned with looking at the major 
differences between trust and reliance, and have suggested trusting 
is an action we can take towards others. One might be persuaded 
by the claim I have put forward that trust is an action we often 
                                                
42 Holton suggests that the reason you might choose to trust is based on a desire to build 
relationships with the people in your drama group. This reason, argues Pamela Hieronymi, is 
not a good reason for trusting, though she suggests it is plausible. Hieronymi, “The Reasons 
of Trust,” p. 219.  
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choose to take toward others, but a notable objection to the 
characterisation of trust I have presented claims trust should not be 
conceived of as an action at all, and as such it cannot be chosen. 
Russell Hardin, arguably the leading philosopher on trust, endorses 
a strict-belief account of trust, but rejects any account of trust that 
posits it as an action one takes toward another.43 Hardin’s objection 
to my characterisation of trust is significant to understanding 
whether trust can be coerced because it follows that if we cannot 
choose to trust, as Hardin argues, we cannot ever be in a position 
where we have no choice but to trust.  
Hardin’s objection to the action-based account is captured in 
its most basic form when he states: “I just do or do not trust to 
some degree, depending on the evidence I have. I do not, in an 
immediate instance, choose to trust, I do not take any risk in 
trusting. Only actions are chosen.”44 Under Hardin’s view, then, 
trust only manifests if people are convinced of the trustworthiness 
of others, and fails to be manifest if they are perceived as 
untrustworthy or not sufficiently trustworthy. For Hardin, a 
person’s trustworthiness is determined by the beliefs we have 
about that person, in accordance with who they are as a person and 
the actions they have performed in the past. The beliefs we have 
about them are essentially things we know about that person, like 
whether they find us favourable or have our interests at heart. In 
this way, the declarations ‘I believe you to be trustworthy’ and ‘I 
trust you’ are equivalent. The extent to which we should think 
there is choosing or choice in any account of trust, Hardin 
recommends that, “we can choose to put ourselves in a position to 
come to know something, but we cannot look at the evidence and 
then decide to know.”45  
I think the strict-belief account of trust is one that should be 
taken seriously. There is a strong case for an account of trusting 
where we trust because we believe someone to be trustworthy.  In 
this way, trust is belief. For example, we trust our parents and 
friends to do a variety of different things for us; there does not 
seem to be a voluntary aspect where we actively make a cognitive 
choice each time we do so. We come to expect our friends and 
family to do these things for us, and in turn we trust them to do so. 
                                                
43 Hardin, Trust & Trustworthiness, p. 58.  
44 Ibid. p. 56. 
45 Ibid. p. 58.  
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Our expectation is grounded in a strong belief we have that our 
parents and friends are sufficiently trustworthy, based on evidence 
of their past actions, and, for example, their good will toward us. 
Given these considerations, Hardin’s perspective of trust is 
certainly a plausible one.46  
Although Hardin’s singular focus on the strict-belief account is 
an appealing position, his sole reliance on the beliefs account 
becomes problematic and unsustainable for him when he denies 
trust can be a form of action, as he closes off a crucial dimension 
of the nature of trust. In cases where we might have competing 
beliefs about someone, Hardin’s position fails to adequately 
accommodate. For example, we may be in a situation where a 
friend has let us down in the past, but seeks redemption and good 
favour with us and asks for us to trust them to do a certain thing. In 
this situation, we might have conflicting beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of our friend, but we might choose to trust him or 
her for other reasons. It could be that they are our friend and we 
generally trust our friends, but because we have been let down in 
the past by this particular friend we are doubtful as to whether in 
this case trust is appropriately placed. Rather than simply believing 
they will do as they say, instead we must make a choice about 
whether to trust our friend and risk a state of vulnerability by 
allowing them to let us down again (or fulfill our expectation that, 
as a friend, they will do as they say they will). Hardin’s position 
does not allow for such a response; for him you either do or do not 
trust your friend and act accordingly given the belief you have.  
Similarly, I think Hardin’s position about our ability to 
selectively weigh up evidence is fundamentally mistaken when he 
states, “the evidence might compel us or it might not, but we do 
not choose the degree to which it does compel us.”47 Returning to 
Holton’s example, we might not be sure whether to trust the 
                                                
46 Hardin’s strict conception of trust does not account for people who give more than ample 
evidence of their trustworthiness, yet still fail to convince their potential “truster” to trust 
them. There seems to be lots of simple situations where people have lots of good evidence to 
trust someone, but the response they receive for their inability to trust is, “there’s just 
something about him (or her).” Often we cannot put our finger on what this particular 
something is, but importantly it informs our ability to trust. We might describe this as our 
intuition, or ‘gut feeling’. In cases like this, it is unlikely that trust is derived solely from the 
beliefs we have, or from some rational weighing up of evidence. Purely emotional elements 
play an integral role in this equation heavily, and a kind of disposition to be more or less 
trusting towards others would also make a significant impact on the judgment of trust.  
47 Ibid. p. 58.  
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members of the drama group, based on the evidence they have 
given us, so whether we trust or not is entirely unclear. We might 
have formed a series of contradictory beliefs about the drama 
group members, and only at the point when we are blindfolded, 
spun around, and prompted to fall, might we have to decide 
whether we ought to trust them.48 When deliberating, one does not 
necessarily form beliefs based on the evidence of trustworthiness, 
but instead, one might make a choice about what sorts of 
relationships they ought to stand in with people: they are choosing 
what sorts of emotions or Strawsonian reactive attitudes they will 
feel. It seems intuitive that when one comes to understand the rules 
of the exercise, they are prompted to make a clear choice whether 
to trust the people in the group.  
Moreover, Hardin’s suggestion you cannot be in a position to 
withhold your trust from someone seems problematic, particularly 
from the consideration of coercion. Intuitively, there are situations 
when we can voluntarily withhold our trust from people. For 
example, you might need a special task completed, and a friend of 
yours might believe they are trustworthy enough to help you 
complete the task; and indeed, they might be. You could, however, 
want to withhold trust from them because you think them 
inappropriate for the task for some other reason, independent of 
their trustworthiness. It would be strange to say you trust them in 
this instance when you deliberately chose not to. Furthermore, 
another good reason you might want to withhold trust from 
someone is as a punitive measure for some prior wrong committed 
against you.49  In this case both parties deem the trust to be 
appropriately manifest, but a decision to withhold trust sends a 
strong message to the opposing party.  
To try and account for Hardin’s objection to the withholding of 
trust, I suggest that even if one decides to do so, an action can be 
chosen and enacted that indicates to others that you do, at the very 
least, rely on them. In the drama case, you can fall and expect not 
to be caught, communicating that you are relying on them, but are 
still withholding trust. In the Strawsonian sense, in this scenario 
you are choosing to take an objective stance to the result of falling, 
                                                
48 Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” p. 68.  
49 This is a legitimate punishment—Philip Pettit argues we all desire to be in good standing 
with those around us. In this way people like being trusted as it indicates to the community 
they are of high standing. In this way withholding trust might be one way to punish a close 
friend or family member. Pettit, “The Cunning of Trust,” p. 214.  
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rather than a participant stance. By the very act of falling you are 
signaling your reliance on being caught, but should your 
expectation that you will not be caught be fulfilled, you are not 
betrayed—you expected as much from the group. The objective 
stance still allows for you to exhibit your anger at being dropped 
because you had to participate in the game and subsequently hurt 
yourself. If, however, your withholding of trust is proved to be the 
wrong decision, afterwards you might say: “I did not trust you to 
catch me, but obviously I should have!”50  
        Pamela Hieronymi, in line with Hardin, questions Holton’s 
formulation of trust as participant reliance, and brings to the 
forefront of the discussion of trust an important tension of 
intuitions regarding how and why it is we trust: She affirms, “I 
think it seems plausible, perhaps commonsensical, to claim that 
trust requires confidence, that, requires something like this belief. 
But in certain cases it seems we can decide to trust someone to do 
something even though we not believe that he or she will.”51 
Despite agreeing with a strict-belief account, Hieronymi ultimately 
accepts the existence of situations where an action-based account 
of trust is plausible. I think acceptance of both accounts is the best 
way to think about the broader nature of trust.  
So, I have shown Hardin’s singular focus on a strict-belief 
account of trust to be generally lacking in terms of determining a 
more comprehensive account of trust. I do accept, however, the 
need for a beliefs element in any account of trusting. In the action-
based account, trust is something we choose to do; in the strict-
belief account, trust is something we have as informed by our 
beliefs about a person. I suggest we think of the broader project of 
trust as having, at the very least, both of these components. We can 
establish trust through our beliefs, but when they fail us and there 
is a lack of evidence, or conflicting evidence, we must choose to 
trust. This includes being able to withhold our trust from someone. 
In this way, trust is more than just believing—trust is also 
communicative through action.52  
 
                                                
50 A number of accounts of trust posit this kind of scenario to be one where trust is initially 
absent, but actions show cause for manifestation and thus trust is built. See Eric Uslaner, 
The Moral Foundations of Trust, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
51 Hieronymi, “The Reasons of Trust,” p. 216.  
52 When we choose to trust, we are signaling that as truster, we endorse the trustee.  
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IV. WHY TRUSTING NECESSARILY REQUIRES A FREE 
CHOICE 
 
In the preceding sections I made the case that we do not make a 
free choice when we rely on someone when it is our only option, 
and defended the characterisation of trust as an action we can 
choose against criticism from Hardin’s narrow conception of the 
strict-belief account. These discussions serve to illustrate two 
important points about reliance: first, when someone limits your 
options for reliance, or you rely because you have no other option, 
you do not make a free choice to rely; second, you can still rely on 
someone even when you have not made a free choice to do so.  
This first claim about reliance is philosophically 
straightforward but serves to help us arrive at a second, more 
important claim regarding trust: When in a position where you 
choose to trust, you trust if and only if you make a free choice to 
trust.53 The tension between reliance and trust becomes apparent on 
the grounds of this second point: the simple but fundamental 
difference between trust and reliance resides in the coercive-
resistant nature of trust, i.e. trust fails to be realised under strict 
conditions of coercion. Coercion, as I state it here, refers to when a 
truster’s options for trusting are externally limited; whether by 
chance, or by he who was a potentially trusted person. Given the 
distinctions made in the previous sections, in this section I will 
show why it is trusting in these situations necessarily requires a 
free choice, and defend the claim against objections. The entirety 
of my claim about trust should be understood as follows:  
 
P1: You trust if and only if you have a trusting belief, or 
you make a free choice to trust.  
P2: If you are relying on someone because it is your only 
option, you do not have a trusting belief. 
P3: If you are relying on someone because it is your only 
option, you are not making a free choice to trust.  
C4: Therefore, you cannot trust because it is your only 
option. 
 
                                                
53 A situation of this kind are situations where your trust is not manifest as a belief.  
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Before I address the free choice condition, however, I will first 
briefly argue that you do not form trusting beliefs when relying is 
your only option.   
 
Defending P2: Why You Don’t Have a Trusting Belief When 
You Rely Because Reliance Is Your Only Option  
 
Before addressing the more interesting question of free choice, I 
will attend to the second premise: that if we are relying on 
someone because it is your only option, we do not have a trusting 
belief. This claim is fairly basic and is not my main focus, hence 
why I will deal with it first. As I have outlined in the first premise, 
when you are in a position where you have all but one option to 
rely, and the option is not judged to be trustworthy, then you do not 
trust.54 The reason for this is clear: a trusting belief is not formed if 
there is no evidence available to convince you someone is 
trustworthy. For example, if on the way home from a late night out, 
there is only one taxi in the suburb and you need to get home to 
look after your children, you will get in the taxi (assuming there 
are no other options). If the taxi driver ignores you, has no formal 
identification, and appears half asleep, he has failed to provide you 
with good evidence that he is trustworthy. Rather than trust him, 
you only rely on him to get you home safely. In situations where 
you are relying on someone because it is your only option, you fail 
to have a trusting belief, and when you fail to have a trusting belief 
in these situations, you cannot trust. The fact that some person is 
your only option is not a good reason for the formation of the 
belief that they will save or come through for you. Moreover, we 
should consider the converse point: if you have a trusting belief, 
then you’re trusting because you think the other person is 
trustworthy. Therefore, you will not be trusting because reliance is 
your only option.  
 
Defending P3: Why You Don’t Trust When You Rely On 
Someone Because It Is Your Only Option  
 
So, I have established the first part of the argument, and will now 
address the second part. Trust, from the formulation of my 
                                                
54 This is in line with the strict-belief account.  
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argument, requires a free choice when in situations where we 
choose, while reliance does not—but why? I have already 
explained why the act of reliance allows for one to be coerced 
while reliance continues to take place, but why is it that the act of 
trusting necessarily requires a free choice when in chosen 
situations? The characterisation of trust I have offered thus far in 
this paper is one where the formation of some kind of relationship 
is crucial to the interaction of trust; when we take the trusting 
Strawsonian participant stance towards others, we are holding them 
responsible for what they ought to do. We hold people to account 
for their actions and participation in the trusting relationship with 
us because we believe what they say they will do, and we think it is 
important to hold them to their word in a relationship where our 
vulnerability, and the achievement of our goal, is at stake. 
 I will argue the main reason why we cannot be coerced into 
trusting in these situations is because it seems incoherent to 
suggest we cannot be in control of how we stand in relation to 
others. Thus, the claim that we must necessarily have a free choice 
to trust resonates with the folk idea that valuable relationships are 
the ones we choose to have.55  
Throughout life we constantly choose to have relationships 
with a wide range of different people for a whole host of different 
purposes. We might think that one of the most important 
relationships one can choose to have is the one we have with our 
spouse. Intuitively, one of the appealing features and intrinsic 
strengths of this kind of relationship is the fact it is chosen—we do 
not usually, for example, endorse forced marriages. It would be 
incoherent to try and convince someone that a forced marriage is a 
kind of relationship we choose to have. Perhaps we can agree to a 
forced marriage, because of cultural expectation and pressure, but 
this is not the same as being free to choose.  
                                                
55 Embedded in the various examples of reliance I have discussed are various forms of 
coercion, and therefore a quality that is fundamentally passive or resigned about the decision 
of the person to rely. To use a persistent cultural term, the act of reliance can be seen as an 
acceptance of fate, a submission to one’s place in the universe as a being that is acted upon. 
The essence of trust is that it offers human beings the possibility of shaping the unknown 
future, by accepting a particular kind of risk and vulnerability in the present within a 
relationship that is freely chosen. Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition asserts that the 
act of forgiveness confers freedom from the past, and the act of making a promise allows us 
to define the unknown future. She writes, “the sovereignty residing in the resulting, limited 
independence from the incalculability of the future, and its limits are the same as those 
inherent in the faculty itself of making and keeping promises.” Hannah Arendt, The Human 
Condition, (London: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 89.  
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What a forced marriage does resemble are the kinds of reliance 
relationships discussed previously, such as Andy’s reliance on the 
sunny picnic day, or the reliance on the café manager, in which a 
series of proxy relationships or collective relationships which 
individually are more or less reliance-based develop some ground 
for either what Hardin terms trust, or at the very least allow a 
person, despite empirical feelings of fear or anxiety, to act in a 
kind of trusting way.56 Importantly, forced marriages are unlike 
arranged marriages, where parents choose possible spouses and 
children are free to say no. Arranged marriages are not coercive 
cases, or cases where there is no other option. They are non-
restrictive or uncoercive cases, compared to the coercive nature of 
forced marriages.  
It is no doubt partially a cultural matter, but in Western 
societies we intuitively feel that marriages are more authentic and 
more valuable when they are chosen. The value arises from the 
capability of free persons to non-coercively come together and 
choose whom to partner with. This thought extends to friendships 
too. We think of the friends we have as partly our friends because 
we chose them to be. This suggests, then, that there are some 
relationships we have in life which are special because they are 
grounded in the fact they are chosen. Operating as an autonomous 
being and exercising free will through choosing these relationships 
is thus a special, valuable quality.  
Trusting relations, I argue, are a certain kind of these special 
relationships. When you are in a position to choose to trust 
someone, you are in a special position of having a free choice to 
trust. Being in such a position is special and valuable to us, as it 
recognizes our free will and autonomy. We might conclude, then, 
that relationships we choose to have and choose to continue—
because they have this special quality—are more valuable than 
relationships we do not choose to have. 57  This is intuitively 
                                                
56 In some societies where arranged marriages are routine (and more forceful), the connubial 
couple are to an extent being coerced into the match on the grounds that their parents, 
extended families, societies or religious leaders have broader understanding or perspective 
about the multitude of criteria that produce a satisfactory marriage. But some small degree 
of trust—whether based on intimate observations of growing up in their parents’ 
households—can flourish and therefore elevate the couples’ role from mere passive 
submitters to their fate of people who acquiesce to coercion and rely on fate in the guise of 
god, history, society, culture, matchmakers or their parents to make their lives bearable. 
57 I suggest that the reason for this intuition could be because the act of choice in the present 
moment on a matter that relates to the uncertain future is, following Arendt, how we 
transform a submission to fate into shaping the future through free choice. 
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attractive to us because it is consistent with our human dignity as 
moral actors in the most basic Kantian sense.  
The thought we should value personal autonomy and a free 
choice in these kinds of situations derives from the moral 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant placed at the heart of his 
moral theory the thought that rational human wills are autonomous. 
Kant believed people should be treated as free and autonomous 
beings—coercion of the basic decision-making faculties was thus 
understood to be wrong and incongruous with the aims of a fully 
functioning society of peoples. 58  Kant made a fundamental 
distinction between treating someone as an object, ‘mere means’, 
and as a person, ‘an end in herself’.59 The idea that we treat others 
as mere means refers to them only as devices we can use to help 
satisfy our desires, contrasted to treating others as an end in 
themselves, where we treat everyone as an intrinsically valuable, 
rational being.60  
One of the foundations of this value is derived from the free 
will and autonomous nature of human beings. When we think of a 
person as free, we think of them as bound only by their own will 
and not by the will of another. The actions people choose to take, 
then, express their own will and not the will of someone or 
something else. So, the free will of the individual is the same will 
needed or expected in choosing to trust.  
Strawson was a scholar of Kant, and the differentiation he 
posited between the objective attitude and the participant attitude 
was based on Kant’s distinction. So, if we take Kant’s point that 
we should value and treat human beings as autonomous rational 
free agents, and we take Strawson’s point that when we take the 
participant stance we prepare ourselves for betrayal and more 
intense emotional reactions, then we should draw a link that 
trusting is an action that we do freely based on people as 
autonomous beings who choose how they stand in relation to 
others. The participant stance is one that a free person takes to 
another free person. Consequently, all participant reactive attitudes 
are freely chosen. Since trust involves reactive attitudes (e.g. 
betrayal), it must be freely chosen.  
                                                
58 Robert S. Taylor, “Kantian Personal Autonomy,” Political Theory 33 5 (2005): 602-28.  
59 Ibid. p. 610. 
60 Ibid. p. 604. 
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A trusting relationship is necessarily a freely chosen one 
because in these chosen situations, only we determine how people 
stand in relation to us; only we decide how we treat others, and 
how we can expect to be treated. Simply, only we can choose to 
take the participant stance towards someone, and because only we 
can choose to take a participant stance towards someone, therefore, 
trust must be freely chosen. We need not decide to take the 
objective stance; this may be our default position. The objective 
stance is what we take when we are not in control of outcomes. 
This determination of not being in control is what characterises the 
objective position and its limited affective nature, and the position 
of being in control is what characterises the participant attitude. So, 
being in a position to choose to trust, we must be in a state of 
complete autonomy, in control of our wills and free from any 
external coercive forces. A Kantian perspective of trusting, then, is 
one where trust is built from the platform of a free choice.  
Thus, when you are in a position to choose to trust, the choice 
you make must be chosen freely. It follows that when you rely on 
someone because it is your only option, you do not make a free 
choice, and you trust in these situations if and only if you have a 
trusting belief or you make a free choice. This is the premise based 
on the assumption you choose what action to take in choosing 
situations, or you trust based on your belief of the trustworthiness 
of the actor. Under this third, ‘free choice’ premise I have posited, 
we trust in situations where we choose only if we have a free 
choice to do so. This biconditional claim about trust is illustrated in 
an opposite formulation: when we have made a free choice to do 
so, we trust. I argue that both formulations of the third premise 
stated here are coherent.  
The first sense of trusting with free choice I have argued for by 
positing that trust must not be coerced, and therefore a free choice 
is necessary, such that we trust only if we have a free choice in 
situations where we choose to trust. The second formulation—
when we want to trust, and we have made a free choice to do so, 
then we do trust—I will argue is equally coherent. When we think 
of trusting, it becomes immediately apparent that a free choice on 
behalf of the truster is the only basic requirement for trust to be 
manifest, assuming there are good reasons to trust and it is 
possible. Intuitively, once we have chosen someone to be the 
recipient of our trust, we then trust. Consider a parallel example 
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with friendship: Once we have chosen someone we deem 
appropriate to be our ‘best friend’, presumably, from then on, they 
are our best friend. It does not matter philosophically (although it 
may be socially awkward) if they have not chosen you to be their 
best friend. In this way, both choosing your friend and choosing 
trust is asymmetrical or one directional.  
So, I have established that we trust in situations where we have 
a trusting belief, and rely when fail to have this belief. I have also 
established that when we are in situations where can choose to 
trust, we trust only if we have a free choice. Trust, then, does not 
manifest when it is our only option. To be clear, I am not making 
the suggestion that you do not trust if you only have one option: I 
am arguing that you do not trust if it is because trusting is your 
only option. The suggestion you do not trust when it is your only 
option would be too harsh a claim in situations where coercion is 
present. The scenario could quite simply dictate that you have only 
one option, but the option you have to trust happens to be a very 
good option. The paddle boarder, for example, might be your only 
option, but you trust the paddle boarder because there are good 
reasons to trust her—through her observable paddle boarding 
skills, and her generosity and good will displayed through her offer 
to help, you have a belief she will do as she says, and you thus 
make a free choice to trust her to help you escape drowning in the 
ocean.61 Through her observable actions, she has indicated to you 
she is willing and capable to take on the responsibility of having 
your trust; namely, of being the custodian of the responsibility you 
give to her. Through her actions convincing you of trustworthiness, 
and your action of choosing to trust, the trusting relationship is 
enabled. In this situation, you are choosing to trust her because you 
believe she is trustworthy; you are not choosing to trust because 
reliance is your only option.  
Now, take the following example as a contrast with reliance 
because it is your only option: imagine that as the unknown paddle 
boarder approaches, you faint from exhaustion, unaware of the 
likelihood you will slip below the waves and drift to your watery 
grave. The circumstances for trust can be manifest are now no 
longer available—you cannot be aware of the trustworthiness of 
the paddle boarder, much less make a free choice whether or not 
                                                
61 I offered the paddle boarder example on page 15.  
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you trust her: perhaps before you passed out, you could not see 
how well she paddle boarded so you have no evidence of her 
ability to help you, and she may not have asked you for help yet. 
Perhaps she came over to tell you how silly your swimming style 
looks! In this case, even if the paddle boarder has the same abilities 
and good will as in the previous scenario, trust cannot be 
established. We would be wrong to say that this one is a trusting 
relationship—rather, we would say this an instance of reliance, or 
hope (that you will be saved). 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to show we do not trust because we 
have only one option; thus, trust has a kind of coercive-resistance: 
when we choose to trust, we must do so freely and willingly. When 
we do otherwise, we are merely hoping or relying on someone to 
come through for us. We intuitively understand reliance and trust 
to be conceptually very similar because of their shared dependence 
on others, but as I have shown, we should be aware that trusting 
goes further than reliance does: when we trust others, we take a 
Strawsonian participant stance, such that we can be betrayed or 
elated depending on whether our trust is fulfilled or unfulfilled.  
The participant stance is one taken between one free person and 
another, and hence is necessarily chosen.   
It would be no mistake to claim that the nature of trust—how 
we give it, and how we receive it—is a difficult concept to fully 
realise. Though in light of the discussion put forward in this paper, 
we should find it nonsensical when someone exclaims to us that we 
have ‘no choice’ but to trust them. It is clear that under conditions 
of coercion, where we have no other alternative options, it is 
indeed the case we have no choice but to hope they go through 
with what they say they will; or we have no choice but to rely on 
them to do what they say; but this does not entail that we have no 
choice but to trust them. The complicated and nuanced nature of 
trust stipulates that whenever we choose to trust, we must have a 
free choice to do so: this is what makes the establishment of a 
trusting relationship so meaningful. The meaningfulness of the 
relationship is found in the dependence on another, and the 
vulnerability that arises from believing they will do as they say. 
When someone fulfills our trust we are grateful and see them in a 
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positive light, as well as enabling trust to be built upon for the 
future. When our trust is unfulfilled we feel betrayed or let down; 
our vulnerability exposed, whether it was a willful betrayal or not. 
We can apply this analysis to our introductory examples of 
everyday trust. When we buy food from the grocery store, or 
deposit money into our bank, it looks from the surface as if we do 
not have any other option. But we should rethink how we conceive 
of these instances: we do not trust the grocery store owner with 
providing our food, or the bank clerk with looking after our money 
if we are relying on them because it is our only option. Instead, we 
just rely on them to provide these things. We should think of trust 
as reserved for more personal relationships with people we find 
trustworthy, people who are able to help us achieve the goals we 
have in mind. In public we rely and depend on strangers to help us 
with our goals and take an objective stance toward them, but in 
private, we are free, emotionally responsible agents who trust 
others with our wellbeing. The differences between trust and 
reliance initially appear to be minor, but upon reflection and 
consideration, they are clearly quite fundamental. We do not trust 
when we are coerced, and we do not trust because we have no 
other choice, because these situations are not suitable for the 
manifestation of trust. All we can do in such situations is rely, and 
hope for the best.  
 
  
